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JURISDICTION 
The United States of America (“the Government” or “EPA”) 
filed this enforcement action against Moon Moo Farm (“Moon 
Moo”) for violating the permitting requirements of the Clean 
Water Act (“CWA”). Deep Quod Riverwatcher and Dean James 
(collectively “Riverwatcher”) joined these CWA claims and 
asserted additional claims in the alternative under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”). On June 1, 2014 the 
district court, which had federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §1331, denied Plaintiffs’ motions for summary 
judgment and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
on all claims. A1, A12.1* This Court has jurisdiction to review the 
district court’s final order. 28 U.S.C. §1291. 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I.  Whether the Queechunk Canal, a navigable waterway 
created through diversion of the Deep Quod River and commonly 
used by the public, is subject to a public right of navigation. 
II. Whether, if the Queechunk Canal is not a subject to a 
public right of navigation, evidence obtained by a private party 
through trespass is admissible in an EPA civil enforcement 
proceeding brought to protect drinking water and ensure ongoing 
CWA compliance. 
III. Whether Moon Moo Farm is a Controlled Animal Feeding 
Operation (“CAFO”) subject to National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (“NPDES”) permitting under the CWA. 
Alternatively, if Moon Moo is not considered a CAFO, whether 
the farm is subject to NPDES permitting requirements. 
 
1 Citations “A__” refer to pages of the Final Problem, Revised on November 18, 
2014. 
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IV. Whether under the statutory definition of “solid waste” 
that applies to an endangerment claim—rather than the 
regulatory definition which applies only to regulatory violations—
Riverwatcher has established that Moon Moo’s spreading 
activities constitute an endangerment to health and the 
environment. And, whether Moon Moo’s soil amendment is a 
“solid waste” for regulatory purposes, and even if it were, whether 
it is exempt from RCRA’s open dumping ban as agricultural 
waste. 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
EPA’s mission—both overall and as applied to this case—is to 
safeguard human health and the environment. Under that 
mission, EPA’s capacity to protect clean rivers and clean drinking 
water fundamentally depends on its ability to bring enforcement 
actions. Here, EPA brought such an action to halt and correct 
violations that endanger not only the Queechunk Canal  
(“Queechunk”) and the Deep Quod River (“Deep Quod”) but also 
the Town of Farmville’s drinking water. Because Congress 
understood the importance of enforcement in ensuring 
compliance with CWA and RCRA standards, it created provisions 
enabling private citizens to assist EPA with enforcement. The 
citizen group Riverwatcher has fulfilled that role here. 
EPA has adopted regulations that protect human health and 
the environment while allowing farms and businesses like Moon 
Moo to continue their operations as long as they comply with 
these standards. EPA’s aim here is to ensure that Moon Moo 
operates in a manner consistent with these standards, ensuring 
protection of health and the environment. 
The enforcement action EPA brought against Moon Moo is 
based on evidence collected by Riverwatcher Dean James in a 
publicly navigable waterway. That evidence shows water with 
excessive levels of pollutants flowing into Queechunk, the Deep 
Quod, and then downstream to Farmville. EPA brought this 
action to remediate Moon Moo’s past violations and force its 
compliance with the applicable statutory and regulatory 
3
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standards now and in the future. Ensuring Moon Moo’s 
compliance, in turn, will help protect the area’s waterways as 
well as Farmville’s drinking water source, in accordance with 
EPA’s mandate. 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Located in the State of New Union, Moon Moo is a dairy farm 
situated at a bend in the Deep Quod, which runs year round and 
flows into the Mississippi River. A5. In the 1940s, the farm’s 
previous owner excavated a 50-yard bypass canal that locals now 
refer to as Queechunk. A5. Today, most of the flow of the Deep 
Quod is diverted through this canal, and many community 
members use it as a shortcut when traveling up and down the 
river. A5. 
The large quantities of liquid waste produced by Moon Moo’s 
cows runs through a series of drains and pipes from the cow barn 
into an outdoor lagoon, where the liquid waste is stored for use as 
fertilizer. A5-6. In 2012, Moon Moo Farm began mixing acid whey 
from the Chokos Greek yogurt processing facility into its liquid 
manure. A6. When Moon Moo fertilizes its 150 acres of Bermuda 
grass fields, the liquid solution from the lagoon is pumped into 
tank trailers that spray it onto the land. A5. The liquid manure 
flows through a drainage ditch from the fields into Queechunk, 
and, from there, into the Deep Quod. Downstream of Moon Moo, 
residents of the City of Farmville rely on the Deep Quod for 
drinking water. A5. 
In late winter and early spring of 2013, the Farmville Water 
Authority issued a nitrate advisory for the city’s drinking water, 
warning residents that high levels of nitrates in the Deep Quod 
made its water hazardous if consumed by infants younger than 
two years of age. A6. During the same time period, several local 
residents alerted the Deep Quod Riverwatcher, a nonprofit 
organization committed to protecting local waterways, that the 
Deep Quod smelled of manure and was an unusually turbid 
brown color. A6. In response to these complaints, Deep Quod 
Riverwatcher Dean James patrolled the river in a small boat. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/3
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While traveling along Queechunk, James observed and 
photographed Moon Moo’s manure-spreading operations taking 
place during a significant storm event. A6. James also observed 
and photographed discolored brown water flowing from Moon 
Moo’s fields through its drainage ditch and into Queechunk. A6. 
Without entering Moon Moo’s property, James took samples of 
the water flowing from the ditch, which he brought to a 
laboratory for testing. The test results showed highly elevated 
levels of nitrates and fecal coliforms. A6. 
Knowledge of the spreading operations and resultant 
elevated levels of nitrates and fecal coliforms drove Riverwatcher 
to serve a letter of intent to sue. In response, EPA brought this 
CWA enforcement action against Moon Moo for injunctive relief 
under 33 U.S.C. §1319(b) and for civil penalties under 33 U.S.C. 
§1319(d). Riverwatcher subsequently intervened as a plaintiff, 
under 33 U.S.C. §1365(b)(1)(B), and alleged additional claims 
under the citizen suit provisions of RCRA. 42 U.S.C. §6972(a)(1). 
Following discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment. 
The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motions for summary 
judgment on their CWA and RCRA claims and granted 
Defendant’s motions for summary judgment ruling in its favor on 
all counts, including a trespass counterclaim against 
Riverwatcher. 
 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine 
dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court of 
Appeals applies a de novo standard of review to a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment and construes the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. See, e.g., Pucino v. 
Verizon Wireless Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT  
First, Riverwatcher Dean James was not trespassing when 
he collected the water sample on April 12, 2013, because the 
public trust doctrine dictates that navigable-in-fact waterways 
are subject to a public right of navigation. The navigable-in-fact 
test includes waterways, like Queechunk, that are navigable only 
after man-made improvements. This general rule is not altered 
by more recent cases dealing with man-made waterways 
designated as private under state law, and there is no indication 
that New Union law designates Queechunk as private. Thus, 
Queechunk is navigable in fact and is subject to a right of public 
navigation as a matter of law, and summary judgment in favor of 
EPA and Riverwatcher is appropriate. 
Even if Queechunk were private under state law, the canal 
would still be subject to a public right of navigation because 
longstanding adverse use by the community has created a public 
prescriptive easement in the canal. Queechunk is also subject to a 
public right of use because it was originally created through the 
diversion of a natural navigable-in-fact waterway. Thus, if this 
Court finds that Queechunk is not a public navigable-in-fact 
waterway as a matter of law, it should remand for further 
findings on the question of whether a right of public use has been 
created through one of these two alternative means. 
Second, if this Court were to find that James’s visit to 
Queechunk constituted trespass, the evidence James collected is 
still admissible in EPA’s civil enforcement proceeding against 
Moon Moo. Most importantly, the exclusionary rule does not 
apply in EPA civil enforcement proceedings because the public 
benefit of preventing further drinking water pollution far 
outweighs the small possibility of deterring Fourth Amendment 
violations. Moreover, EPA enforcement actions are prospective 
and remedial—not punitive—unlike criminal cases in which the 
rule generally applies. Lastly, even in the rare civil proceedings 
where it might apply, the exclusionary rule does not apply to 
evidence collected by private parties like James. 
Third, Moon Moo meets all of the regulatory requirements for 
CAFOs. Importantly, Moon Moo qualifies as a CAFO because a 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/3
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man-made drainage ditch conveys liquid fertilizer from the fields 
of Bermuda grass into Queechunk. The fertilizer sprayed on the 
fields that flowed into Queechunk is not agricultural stormwater 
pollution. EPA regulations and court precedent dictate that 
discharges from CAFOs are agricultural stormwater discharges 
only when farms adhere to satisfactory Nutrient Management 
Plans (“NMPs”). Moon Moo’s practices, which are allegedly 
consistent with its NMP, were clearly the result of an 
inappropriate plan. The Court should hold that as a CAFO, the 
farm has a duty to apply for a NPDES permit. If, however, the 
Court finds insufficient evidence that the drainage ditch was a 
conveyance and therefore determines that Moon Moo is not a 
CAFO, the Court should find that Moon Moo does not have a duty 
to apply for a NPDES permit because it is a nonpoint source. In 
either circumstance, Plaintiffs-Appellants are entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law on their CWA claims. 
Fourth, though EPA did not join Riverwatcher’s RCRA 
claims, the district court mistakenly applied the same regulatory 
definition of “solid waste” in its rejection of both the 
endangerment and open dumping claims. For the endangerment 
claim it should instead have applied the broader statutory 
definition, which the soil application meets. Accordingly, the 
district court erred in dismissing that claim and this Court 
should grant summary judgment for Riverwatcher or, if it deems 
that the record is inadequate for the fact-intensive endangerment 
inquiry, this Court should remand for additional fact-finding. 
However, the district court correctly determined, and this Court 
should affirm, that according to the regulatory definition of “solid 
waste,” Moon Moo has not violated the open dumping ban. 
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ARGUMENT 
I.  JAMES DID NOT TRESPASS ON MOON MOO’S 
PROPERTY BECAUSE QUEECHUNK CANAL IS 
SUBJECT TO A PUBLIC RIGHT OF NAVIGATION. 
James’s visit to Queechunk did not constitute trespass 
because Queechunk is subject to a public right of navigation. The 
public right of navigation, also sometimes described as a right of 
public use, at a minimum includes public use for “navigation and 
commerce.” Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 457 (1892). 
The right of public navigation can arise from a variety of sources; 
in Queechunk it flows from the public trust doctrine, a public 
easement, and the fact that Queechunk was established by 
replacement of a navigable waterway. 
A.   Queechunk Canal is Subject to a Public Right of 
Navigation Because it is a Public Trust Navigable 
Waterway 
Under the public trust doctrine, navigable waterways are 
“held in trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the 
navigation of the waters.” Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452.2 
While “the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law,” 
PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012), the 
state’s control over navigable waters is “subject . . . to the 
paramount power of the United States to control such waters for 
purposes of navigation,” id. at 1228 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The Supreme Court has called this federal navigation 
servitude “a superior navigation easement.” United States v. 
Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 225 (1956). Thus, under 
public trust doctrine and the related federal navigation servitude, 
navigable waterways are subject to a public right of navigation. 
 
 2. In the United States, the public trust doctrine applies to navigable waters 
that are nontidal as well as tidal. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 
1226-27 (2012). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/3
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The definition of what constitutes a navigable waterway, and 
is thus subject to the public trust doctrine and the federal 
navigation servitude, has been recognized for more than a 
century: “Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable 
rivers in law which are navigable in fact.” The Daniel Ball, 77 
U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). The Supreme Court’s four-part 
test originally held that waterways are navigable in fact if they 
are: 
used, or are susceptible of being used, [1] in their ordinary 
condition, [2] as highways for commerce, over which trade and 
travel are or may be conducted [3] in the customary modes of 
trade and travel on water . . . [4] when they form . . . by 
themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway 
over which commerce is or may be carried on. 
Id. The Supreme Court later eliminated the “ordinary condition” 
requirement, recognizing that “[t]o appraise the evidence of 
navigability on the natural condition only of the waterway is 
erroneous.” United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 
U.S. 377, 407 (1940).3 Except for the elimination of this 
requirement, the basic navigable-in-fact test remains unchanged 
today. See PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1228 (citing The Daniel Ball’s 
navigable-in-fact test but noting that the ordinary condition 
requirement does not apply in all situations). 
Queechunk meets these requirements for the modern 
navigable-in-fact test. First, Queechunk is “commonly used” for 
travel, A5, thereby satisfying the “trade or travel” prong. Second, 
the “customary modes” prong has been interpreted to mean that a 
waterway must be capable of navigation by a small boat or canoe. 
See, e.g., FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC v. FERC, 287 F.3d 1151, 
1157 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Queechunk meets this prong of the test too, 
as James was able to navigate the canal in his jon boat, A6, which 
is comparable in size to a canoe, see United States v. Sasser, 738 
 
 3. While the case eliminating this requirement dealt with the scope of 
Congress’s authority over a waterway, it should be interpreted to apply to the 
navigable-in-fact test generally, as it was decided before the Supreme Court 
created the split between Congress’s regulatory power and the right of public 
use. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177-78 (1979); see also id. 
at 185 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining that, until this case, no case had 
ever “call[ed] certain waters ‘navigable’ for some purposes, but ‘non-navigable’ 
for purposes of the navigational servitude”). 
9
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F. Supp. 177, 178 (D.S.C. 1990) (describing the size of a jon boat). 
Finally, Queechunk originates from and flows back into the Deep 
Quod, which “runs into the Mississippi River, . . . a navigable-in-
fact interstate body of water that has long been used for 
commercial navigation.” A5. Thus, Queechunk meets the 
“highway [for] commerce” prong, the final prong of the navigable-
in-fact test. Queechunk is therefore navigable in fact and must be 
“regarded as [a] public navigable river[] in law.” The Daniel Ball, 
77 U.S. at 563. 
The right of public navigation attaching to Queechunk is 
unchanged by cases holding that there may not be a public right 
of use in a man-made body of water that is considered private 
under state law. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 
(1979), the Supreme Court held that “a body of water that was 
private property under Hawaiian law” was not subject to a public 
right of access simply by being “linked to navigable water by a 
channel dredged by [the owners of the pond],” id. at 179-80. 
Circuit courts applying Kaiser Aetna have consistently read it 
to mean that there is no public right of navigation where a man-
made body of water is designated as private under state law. For 
example, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[t]he [Supreme] Court 
placed significant weight on the treatment of Kuapa Pond as 
private property and the reasonable investment-backed 
expectations of the Pond’s owners.” Boone v. United States, 944 
F.2d 1489, 1502 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 
at 166-67). In applying the Kaiser Aetna doctrine to a case 
factually similar to Kaiser Aetna, therefore, the Ninth Circuit 
found that the water body in question was not subject to a right of 
public access because it was not navigable in its natural state and 
because “under Hawaiian law . . . [its] private nature [was] 
beyond dispute.” Boone, 944 F.2d at 1502. Similarly, where the 
Fifth Circuit held that a privately dredged canal was not subject 
to a public right of use, it reached this conclusion only after 
finding that “the record clearly reflects that all of the remaining 
waterways at issue are privately owned” under state law. Dardar 
v. Lafourche Realty Co., 55 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1995). 
Contrary to these circuit court interpretations, the district 
court here wrongly read Kaiser Aetna to stand for the blanket 
proposition that “there is no public right of navigation in a man-
made water body.” A9. In fact, Kaiser Aetna only applies to the 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/3
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relatively narrow set of cases in which a man-made body of water 
is explicitly found to be private under state law. In the absence of 
such a finding, Kaiser Aetna leaves intact the existing framework 
holding that a waterway that is navigable in fact is subject to a 
public right of navigation. Here, there is no suggestion that 
Queechunk—a waterway fed directly from and flowing back into 
a publicly navigable river—is inherently private under state law.4 
Indeed, the district court found that New Union has not 
developed any state law on the scope of navigation rights or the 
public trust doctrine as they apply to man-made or natural 
waterways.5 A9. Thus, Kaiser Aetna does not alter the conclusion 
that, as a navigable-in-fact waterway, Queechunk is subject to a 
public right of navigation. 
There is no dispute of material facts as to the physical status 
of Queechunk: Queechunk’s physical attributes satisfy the 
modern test for a navigable-in-fact waterway, and Queechunk is 
thus subject to a right of public navigation. Therefore, this Court 
should deny Defendant’s motion and should grant summary 
judgment for Riverwatcher on the trespass counterclaim. 
B.   Even if Queechunk Canal Were Not a Public Trust 
Waterway, it is Still Subject to a Public Right Of 
Navigation 
Even if a water body is private under state law, a public right 
of navigation may be created through other means. Queechunk is 
subject to a public right of navigation both because public use has 
created a prescriptive easement, and because the canal was 
created through the diversion of a naturally navigable waterway, 
allowing the canal to substitute for that waterway. 
 
 4. Though Moon Moo owns the land on the sides and bottom of the canal, 
A2, streambed ownership has no bearing on the public trust doctrine or on 
federal powers over the water flowing through the stream, PPL Montana, 132 S. 
Ct. at 1234-35. 
 5. In fact, some states apply an even more lenient test than the federal test 
for determining which waters are public. See, e.g., Tex. River Barges v. City of 
San Antonio, 21 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding that the statutory 
definition “render[s] all streams navigable in law that have an average width of 
30 feet, regardless of ownership of the bed . . . and regardless of whether they 
are actually navigable”). 
11
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1.  Longstanding, Continuous, Adverse Use has 
Created a Public Prescriptive Easement in 
Queechunk 
Prescriptive public easements can create a public right-of-
way in a formerly private property. While the modern 
requirements for a prescriptive easement vary slightly by state, 
most states require that public use be (1) open and notorious 
(meaning visible and known to the owner), (2) adverse to the 
owner, and (3) continuous and uninterrupted for a period 
typically ranging from ten to twenty years. See, e.g., Fogerty v. 
State, 187 Cal. App. 3d 224, 238 (Ct. App. 1986); Graham v. 
Mack, 699 P.2d 590, 595 (Mont. 1984); see also 2 Am. Jur. Proof of 
Facts 3d 197, § 2 (1988) (cataloguing requirements under state 
property law). States that have considered easements in private 
waterways have found that the doctrine of prescriptive easement, 
which typically pertains to land, “appl[ies] by analogy to rights-of-
way over non-navigable streams.” Buffalo River Conservation & 
Recreation Council v. Nat’l Park Serv., 558 F.2d 1342, 1345 (8th 
Cir. 1977); see also State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1363 
(Kan. 1990). 
Queechunk meets these standard requirements for a 
prescriptive public easement. First, “the Canal is commonly used 
as a shortcut.” A5. Because Queechunk is widely used by the 
public, it is likely that this frequent use is also widely known. 
Second, it is clear that public use is adverse to the owner, as 
Moon Moo has posted “No Trespassing” signs along the canal 
rather than inviting the public to use it freely. A5. Finally, the 
ongoing and “common” use of the canal, A5, provides no 
indication that the public usage has been interrupted or 
inconsistent. Rather, it appears likely that the canal has been 
publicly used since its creation in the 1940s, A5, thus easily 
satisfying the requirement of continuous use for ten to twenty 
years. 
Thus, the facts on the record suggest that the public has 
acquired a prescriptive easement in Queechunk, and this Court 
should find a public right of use in the canal. At the very least, 
the record raises a dispute of material fact about the existence of 
such an easement, in which case this Court should remand the 
question to the district court for further findings of fact. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/3
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2.  Queechunk Canal was Created Through the 
Diversion of a Navigable Waterway, Giving the 
Public a Right of Navigation 
Even in the absence of a prescriptive easement, an artificial 
navigable waterway that would otherwise be considered private 
may nonetheless be subject to a public right of navigation if it 
was created “in part by means of diversion or destruction of a pre-
existing natural navigable waterway.” Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp. 
(Vaughn I), 444 U.S. 206, 208 (1979). In Vaughn I, the companion 
case to Kaiser Aetna, the Supreme Court created this exception to 
the Kaiser Aetna rule for instances where a “system of artificial 
waterways was substituted for the pre-existing natural system of 
navigable waterways.” Id. at 209. As the Louisiana Supreme 
Court explained in later proceedings in that case, “The [U.S.] 
Supreme Court’s opinion indicates that defendants would have a 
right under federal law to use [manmade] canals as a substitute 
for any natural, navigable waterway substantially impaired or 
destroyed by construction of the artificial system.” Vermilion 
Corp. v. Vaughn (Vaughn II), 397 So. 2d 490, 492 (La. 1981). 
There is strong evidence that this exception applies to 
Queechunk. First, Queechunk was “excavated [as] a bypass canal 
in the Deep Quod,” A5, so Queechunk was clearly created “by 
means of diversion . . . of a pre-existing natural navigable 
waterway,” Vaughn I, 444 U.S. at 208. Moreover, “[m]ost of the 
flow of the Deep Quod River is diverted into the Queechunk 
Canal,” A5, indicating that the Deep Quod was “substantially 
impaired” by the construction of Queechunk, Vaughn II, 397 So. 
2d at 492. Thus, the facts on the record indicate that Queechunk 
serves as “a substitute for [a] natural, navigable waterway,” id., 
and accordingly, this Court should find a public right of 
navigation in the canal. At a minimum, the record creates a 
question of material fact regarding the extent to which 
Queechunk serves as a substitute for the Deep Quod, and the 
Court should remand for further findings of fact on this issue. 
13
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II.  THE EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY JAMES IS 
ADMISSIBLE IN THE CIVIL ENFORCEMENT 
PROCEEDING INITIATED BY EPA 
The exclusionary rule, where it applies, excludes evidence 
collected illegally or without a warrant. “[T]he rule’s prime 
purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby 
effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment.” United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). Thus, the rule 
typically applies only in criminal cases: “‘[i]n the complex and 
turbulent history of the rule, the [Supreme] Court never has 
applied it to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or 
state.’” INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1984) 
(quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976)).6 There 
is no reason for this Court to diverge from Supreme Court 
precedent and extend the exclusionary rule to this civil 
proceeding. 
A.    The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply in EPA 
Civil Enforcement Proceedings 
The exclusionary rule does not apply in EPA enforcement 
actions because the costs and benefits of applying the rule weigh 
strongly against applying it in proceedings to protect public 
health and the environment, see Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 
1041, and the proceedings aim at prospective relief rather than 
punishment, id. at 1046. 
1.    The Minimal Benefit of Applying the 
Exclusionary Rule Does Not Justify the High 
Cost of Excluding Valuable Evidence in EPA 
Enforcement Proceedings 
In deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule in a non-
criminal context, the Supreme Court applies a balancing test 
that: 
 
 6. The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue since Lopez-Mendoza in 
1984, so it remains true that the Court has never applied the rule to exclude 
evidence in a civil proceeding. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/3
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weigh[s] the likely social benefits of excluding unlawfully 
obtained evidence against the likely costs. On the benefit side of 
the balance the prime purpose of the exclusionary rule . . . is to 
deter future unlawful police conduct. On the cost side there is the 
loss of often probative evidence and . . . secondary costs that flow 
from the less accurate or more cumbersome adjudication that 
therefore occurs. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041 (internal citations omitted). In 
the only two cases where the Supreme Court analyzed whether 
the exclusionary rule should apply in civil proceedings, it decided 
the cost of applying the rule outweighed the possible deterrence 
benefits, and thus declined to apply the rule. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 
U.S. at 1050; Janis, 428 U.S. at 454. 
In the instant case, applying the exclusionary rule would 
mean excluding evidence that shows Moon Moo has polluted a 
waterway that Farmville relies on for drinking water. Such an 
outcome would deprive EPA of the ability to bring a civil 
enforcement proceeding to protect Farmville’s drinking water and 
ensure Moon Moo’s ongoing CWA compliance. The social costs of 
applying the exclusionary rule in this case are therefore very 
high. On the other side of the scale, the possible deterrence 
benefit of applying the exclusionary rule is likely low. As 
discussed further below, a private citizen is unlikely to be 
deterred from collecting evidence by a rule designed to deter 
unlawful government conduct. The low deterrence benefit here is 
outweighed by the high social costs at stake; thus the Supreme 
Court’s balancing test dictates that the exclusionary rule must 
not be extended to apply to EPA civil enforcement proceedings. 
2.  The Primary Purpose of the Proceeding is 
Prospective Relief, Not Punishment 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
cost of applying the exclusionary rule in proceedings intended to 
prevent ongoing violations—where courts would be “closing their 
eyes to ongoing violations of the law”—is so great as to be 
unacceptable. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1046. Presenting a 
hypothetical example strikingly similar to the case at bar, the 
Court stated: 
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Presumably no one would argue that the exclusionary rule 
should be invoked to prevent an agency from ordering corrective 
action at a leaking hazardous waste dump if the evidence 
underlying the order had been improperly obtained . . . . On the 
rare occasions that it has considered costs of this type the Court 
has firmly indicated that the exclusionary rule does not extend 
this far. 
Id. Interpreting that case, some circuit courts have focused on 
whether the relief sought is prospective or punitive in nature. 
E.g., Trinity Indus., Inc. v. OSHRC, 16 F.3d 1455, 1461-62 (6th 
Cir. 1994); Smith Steel Casting Co. v. Brock, 800 F.2d 1329 (5th 
Cir. 1986); Garrett v. Lehman, 751 F.2d 997, 1002 (9th Cir. 1985). 
In all of these cases, the court found that the exclusionary rule 
does not apply when the relief sought is prospective, but it may 
apply when the relief sought is punitive, as punitive sanctions 
tend to be more analogous to the criminal context. Compare 
Garrett, 751 F.2d at 1002 (exclusionary rule did not apply in 
military discharge hearings because they were prospective), with 
Trinity Indus., 16 F.3d at 1462 (exclusionary rule may apply in 
OSHA proceeding seeking punitive monetary penalties). 
EPA’s enforcement action against Moon Moo seeks to halt 
current CWA violations and prospectively ensure Moon Moo’s 
ongoing and future compliance with the CWA.7 Analogizing from 
the hazardous waste violation hypothesized in Lopez-Mendoza, an 
injunction to stop CWA violations is clearly a form of prospective 
relief. Thus, the exclusionary rule does not apply to James’s 
evidence for purposes of the injunctive relief sought under 33 
U.S.C. §1319(b).8 
Nor does the exclusionary rule apply to the civil penalties 
sought under 33 U.S.C. §1319(d), because “monetary penalties 
 
 7. Riverwatcher’s RCRA claims are also grounded in this evidence. The 
Government has found no case law to suggest that the exclusionary rule would 
apply differently to those claims. 
 8. Contrary to the district court’s broad statements, A9, this conclusion is 
not questioned by any of the cases analyzing the exclusionary rule in the civil 
context. Indeed, even courts that used the exclusionary rule to bar evidence in 
OSHA actions for civil penalties nonetheless reiterated that “we do not believe 
that the exclusionary rule should be invoked to prevent the Secretary of Labor 
from ordering correction of OSHA violations . . . , even though the evidence . . . 
was improperly obtained.” Smith Steel Casting, 800 F.2d at 1334 (emphasis in 
original). 
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[have not] historically been viewed as punishment.” Hudson v. 
United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997). Rather, monetary 
penalties are civil as long as they are not “so punitive in form and 
effect as to render them criminal despite Congress’ intent.” Id. 
Here, the primary purpose of the civil penalties sought by EPA is 
not to punish but rather to help EPA recover its costs of 
enforcement (thus ensuring future compliance), to fund 
remediation for past damages, and to deter future violations. The 
Supreme Court has specifically explained that a civil penalty 
“may be remedial in character if it merely reimburses the 
government for its actual costs arising from the defendant’s . . . 
conduct.” Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 
777 (1994). Under this standard, as well as under the broader 
rule interpreting monetary penalties as civil, the exclusionary 
rule is inapplicable to EPA’s action for civil penalties, which is 
remedial rather than punitive. 
B.  The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply to James’ 
Evidence, Because the Evidence Was Collected by 
a Private Party 
Even if the exclusionary rule applied in EPA enforcement 
proceedings, “[i]t is well established . . . that the exclusionary 
rule, as a deterrent sanction, is not applicable where a private 
party . . . commits the offending act,” United States v. Janis, 428 
U.S. 433, 455 n.31 (1976). This is because the rule would not  
“have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct” of a private 
party (or a sovereign other than the one prosecuting the case). Id. 
at 454. 
The Supreme Court has created a narrow exception 
recognizing that “where a private party acts as an ‘instrument or 
agent’ of the state in effecting a search or seizure, fourth 
amendment interests are implicated” and the exclusionary rule 
may apply. United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 
1981) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 
(1971)). The two primary factors for determining whether a 
private party acted as an instrument or agent of the state are: 
“(1) the government’s knowledge and acquiescence, and (2) the 
intent of the party performing the search.” Walther, 652 F.2d at 
792. “If both factors are present, a private party will be 
considered to have acted as a government agent.” United States v. 
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Harrison, 168 F.3d 483, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 910, at *2 (4th 
Cir. Jan. 25, 1999). If either factor is not satisfied, the private 
party acted independently and the evidence is admissible. 
James clearly acted independently in collecting the water 
sample from Queechunk Canal. The record strongly suggests that 
James was alone when he visited Queechunk and collected the 
sample, thus no EPA officers were present. A6. And no party has 
suggested that EPA had any knowledge of or influence on James’s 
decision to collect the sample. Instead, because he acted without 
the government’s “knowledge or acquiescence,” Walther, 652 F.2d 
at 792, James cannot be considered an “instrument or agent” of 
the government for purposes of the exclusionary rule. Because the 
exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence collected by private 
parties except under the narrow “instrument or agent” carve-out, 
id., the water-quality evidence James collected is admissible in 
this civil enforcement proceeding. 
III.  MOON MOO IS A CAFO SUBJECT TO NPDES 
PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE 
CWA 
Congress enacted the CWA with the ultimate goal of 
“eliminat[ing] the discharge of pollutants into the navigable 
waters.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(6), (a)(1). It proscribes the 
“discharge of pollutants” from “point sources,” which are defined 
as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). To further this goal, the EPA 
created the CAFO classification to designate as point sources 
operations that congregate animals and concentrate manure and 
other waste. Moon Moo’s discharges meet all of EPA’s criteria for 
CAFO classification and, because the discharge was not caused by 
rain, its discharges are subject to NPDES permitting 
requirements. 
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A.   Moon Moo Qualifies as a CAFO and Should be 
Subject to NPDES Permitting Because it 
Discharges Manure From its Land Application 
Area 
1.  Moon Moo Fulfills All of the Regulatory 
Requirements for a CAFO 
As the district court opinion states, Moon Moo fits squarely 
into the regulatory definition of a CAFO. A8; 40 C.F.R. §122.23. 
Moon Moo firstly qualifies as an animal feeding operation 
(“AFO”) because the facility confines milk cows throughout the 
year. The regulation states: 
Animal feeding operation . . . means a lot or facility . . . where the 
following conditions are met: (i) Animals . . . have been, are, or 
will be stabled or confined and fed or maintained for a total of 45 
days or more in any 12-month period, and (ii) Crops, vegetation, 
forage growth, or post-harvest residues are not sustained in the 
normal growing season over any portion of the lot or facility. 
40 C.F.R. §122.23(b)(1). Moon Moo’s practice of confining cows all 
year without pasturing them clearly fits the first prong of the 
AFO test. A4. The farm’s 150 acres of fields do not violate the 
test’s second prong because the Bermuda grass is not grown 
within the animal confinement area. See 40 C.F.R. §122.23(b)(3) 
(defining “land application area”); Concerned Area Residents for 
the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(“[t]he [CAFO] vegetation criterion applies to the lot or facility in 
which the animals are confined”); Office of Wastewater Mgmt., 
NPDES Permit Writers’ Manual for Concentrated Animal Feeding 
Operations, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 2-3, (Feb. 2012) [hereinafter 
NPDES Manual] (stating that the second AFO prong “relates to 
the portion of the facility where animals are confined”). 
In order to qualify as a CAFO, an AFO must meet two 
additional requirements: first, it must house between 200 and 
699 mature dairy cows, whether milked or dry, 40 C.F.R. 
122.23(b)(6)(i)(A); and second, it must meet one of the following 
conditions: “(A) Pollutants are discharged into waters of the 
United States through a man-made ditch . . . or other similar 
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man-made device; or (B) Pollutants are discharged directly into 
waters of the United States . . . .” 
40 C.F.R. §122.23(b)(6)(ii).9 For the last two years, Moon Moo has 
housed 350 dairy cows, well within the range of 200 to 699 
mature dairy cows necessary for qualification as a Medium 
CAFO. 40 C.F.R. §122.23(b)(6)(i)(A). The farm also directly fulfills 
the discharge requirements as defined under part (A). 40 C.F.R. 
§122.23(b)(6)(ii)(A). The drainage ditch acts to funnel liquid waste 
sprayed onto the fields into Queechunk. The ditch’s role as a 
conveyance for pollutants qualifies the Farm as a CAFO because 
(1) the liquid fertilizer mixture sprayed on the grass is a pollutant 
under the CWA, (2) the body of water into which the pollutants 
are drained is a water of the United States, and (3) the man-made 
drainage ditch was the mechanism through which the pollutants 
applied onto the land were conveyed into the waters. 
First, the manure-whey mixture Moon Moo applied to the 
farm’s land application area is a pollutant. The CWA defines 
“pollutant” as “agricultural waste discharged into water,” 33 
U.S.C. § 1362(6), and “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition 
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,” 33 
U.S.C. 1362(12)(A). The flow of the fertilizer solution from Moon 
Moo’s fields, through the drainage ditch and into Queechunk is 
properly considered the discharge of a pollutant because the 
solution, a pollutant, originated from a CAFO, which is, by 
statutory definition, a point source. 40 C.F.R. §122.23(a) (CAFOs 
“are point sources, subject to NPDES permitting requirements as 
provided in this section”). 
Second, it is undisputed that Queechunk runs directly into 
the Deep Quod, which runs year-round and flows into the 
Mississippi River, a navigable interstate waterway. A5. 
Provisions prohibiting the discharge of pollutants into waters of 
the United States extend to water bodies that do not flow across 
state borders if they are part of a larger system connecting them 
to a navigable river. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 717 
(2006) (“[A] water or wetland constitutes ‘navigable waters’ under 
the [CWA] if it possesses a ‘significant nexus’ to waters that are 
navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so made.”); N. River 
 
 9. These requirements apply to Medium CAFOs. Different criteria and 
responsibilities apply to Small and Large CAFOs. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.23(b)(4); 
(b)(9). 
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Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(finding a water-filled quarry is a “navigable water” under the 
CWA because it is “part of a larger wetland that is ‘adjacent’ to 
the River” and there exists a “substantial nexus” as required by 
Rapanos).10 Most of the Deep Quod’s water is diverted through 
Queechunk, and Queechunk flows directly back into the Deep 
Quod. A5. Thus, there is clearly a sufficient nexus between 
Queechunk, the Deep Quod, and the Mississippi to consider the 
canal a water of the United States. 
Third, the drainage ditch played an important role in 
conveying the fertilizer solution into the canal. The district court 
described the undisputed fact that “discolored brown water 
flow[ed] from the fields through a drainage ditch into the 
Queechunk Canal.” A6. The drainage ditch’s role in the 
architecture of the farm—to drain excess manure flowing from 
the fields—comfortably meets the common law definition of a 
discharge: to “add pollutants from the outside world to navigable 
water.” Comm. to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util. 
Dist., 13 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Nat’l Wildlife 
Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1988)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Moon Moo may argue that the drainage ditch was created to 
convey stormwater from the farm’s property into Queechunk, 
rather than conveying pollutants into U.S. waters. However, as 
EPA has indicated in guidance documents, a conveyance that 
transports waste is considered to serve this purpose whether it 
was intended for that purpose or not. NPDES Manual, at 2-9 
(noting that “[a] man-made channel or ditch that was not created 
specifically to carry animal wastes but nonetheless does so is 
considered a man-made device” for the purposes of the statute’s 
requirement that pollutants are discharged into the waters 
through a man-made ditch or other man-made device). Because 
Moon Moo meets all of the requirements for an AFO and a CAFO, 
the farm is a CAFO under the CWA. Moon Moo’s qualification as 
a CAFO makes it a point source. 40 C.F.R. §122.23(a). 
 
 10. Because it flows from the interpretation of specific statutory language, 
the definition of “waters of the United States” under the CWA does not affect the 
analysis of navigable waters discussed in Part I. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 723-24 
(discussing the divergence of the common law and statutory definitions of 
“navigable waters of the United States”). 
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2.  Precedent Dictates that Moon Moo is a CAFO 
No binding case law, to the Government’s knowledge, 
disputes the finding that Moon Moo’s discharges come from a 
point source due to the farm’s classification as a CAFO. The lower 
court’s reliance on Alt v. EPA, 979 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D.W. Va. 
2013), to assert that the discharge in the instant case is 
agricultural stormwater runoff, and not a CAFO discharge, 
represents a misapplication of that relatively narrow holding to 
the instant case. While Alt, a Northern District of West Virginia 
case, indicates that some CAFO discharges are considered 
agricultural stormwater discharges despite CAFOs’ status as 
point sources, id. at 715, the facts of Alt are materially different 
from those of the instant case. In Alt, dry particles of manure and 
litter from the farm’s eight poultry confinement houses were 
tracked and spilled in the farmyard surrounding the CAFO. 
Additionally, the ventilation systems in the enclosed houses blew 
“some dust composed of manure, litter and dander, and some 
feathers” onto the farmyard, where the pollutants “settled on the 
ground.” Id. at 704. In Alt, rainfall was required in this case to 
move the dry dust particles from the farmyard into the nearby 
waterway. Id. (stating that precipitation “contacted the particles” 
and “carried” them into a water of the United States). That 
situation is substantially different from the instant case, where 
liquid manure sprayed onto the fields flowed directly into the 
canal. A6. 
The Alt court indicated the steps that Lois Alt used to 
prevent manure and litter from exposure to precipitation. Among 
these was “[e]xercise of reasonable care in cleaning up manure or 
litter that might spill during transfer operations” Alt, 979 F. Supp 
2d at 705. This level of care differs drastically from the practices 
exercised by Moon Moo’s operators. Far from cleaning up spilled 
manure that might be exposed to precipitation, Moon Moo 
sprayed large amounts of manure onto its fields during a 
significant rain event in which two inches of rain fell in just two 
days. A6. Dr. Ella Mae indicated that the application of manure 
during any rain event is an extremely poor management practice, 
and that it will nearly always result in nutrient loss. In addition, 
Dr. Mae tested the fertilizer used by Moon Moo—a combination of 
liquid manure from the farm’s cows and acid whey from the 
Chokos plant—and found that the mixture had a pH of 6.1, 
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making it a weak acid. Dr. Mae stated that the acidity of the 
liquid prevented the Bermuda grass crop from effectively taking 
up the nutrients in the mixture. Dr. Emmet Green, Moon Moo’s 
expert, did not dispute that the acid whey reduced the soil pH 
and reduced nitrogen uptake by the grass. A6. Moon Moo’s choice 
to fertilize soil already saturated with rainwater and spray a 
solution that would severely limit the crop’s ability to take up its 
nutrients does not constitute “reasonable care.” Compare A6 
(describing Moon Moo’s practices), with Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 
705 (describing significant efforts to contain even small amounts 
of pollutants). 
It is also important to note that the pollutant discharge in 
the instant case was not caused by water precipitation causing 
fertilizer runoff, the test Southview Farm sets out for identifying 
agricultural stormwater discharges. 34 F.3d at 120-121 (“[A]ll 
discharges eventually mix with precipitation run-off in ditches or 
streams or navigable waters so the fact that the discharge might 
have been mixed with run-off cannot be determinative.”) The 
Southview court instead looks to whether the discharge is a 
“result of the precipitation.” Id. at 121. As in Southview, Moon 
Moo’s discharges “were not the result of rain, but rather simply 
occurred on days when it rained.” Id. at 121. The liquid manure 
was capable of flowing into the water on its own, and the 
significant rain event that occurred over a two-day period only 
ensured that the soils were saturated and less likely to absorb the 
manure solution. See id. (crediting testimony that “after a rain[ ] 
and manure had been applied on the field, [the manure] was 
literally running off everywhere up and down those field[s]”).   
3.  As a CAFO that Discharges Pollutants into a 
Navigable Water, Moon Moo is Subject to 
NPDES Permitting Requirements 
EPA regulations require CAFOs including Moon Moo to 
apply for a NPDES permit: 
The discharge of manure, litter or process wastewater to waters 
of the United States from a CAFO as a result of the application of 
that manure, litter or process wastewater by the CAFO to land 
areas under its control is a discharge from that CAFO subject to 
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NPDES permit requirements, except where it is an agricultural 
storm water discharge as provided in 33 U.S.C. [§] 1362(14). 
40 C.F.R. §122.23(e); see also Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. 
EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 749-51 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that there is 
no duty to apply for a NPDES permit for possible discharges, but 
such a duty exists for CAFOs that actually discharge); 
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 504-06 (2d Cir. 
2005). The EPA regulations state that a CAFO is subject to 
NPDES permitting if its land application of manure discharges 
“to waters of the United States” unless “it is an agricultural storm 
water discharge as provided in 33 U.S.C. 1362(14).” 40 C.F.R. 
§122.23(e). This rule further states that a precipitation-related 
discharge of manure from land areas under the control of a CAFO 
is considered an agricultural stormwater discharge only when 
manure has been applied in accordance with site-specific nutrient 
management practices and the practices “ensure appropriate 
agricultural utilization of the nutrients in the manure, litter or 
process wastewater, as specified in §122.42(e)(1)(vi)-(ix).” 40 
C.F.R. §122.23(e); see also Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d at 496, 507 
(defining “point source” as “generally authorizing the regulation 
of CAFO discharges, but exempting such discharges from 
regulation to the extent that they constitute agricultural 
stormwater”). 
First, the events that occurred at Moon Moo cannot be 
considered agricultural stormwater discharge because of the way 
that courts have interpreted this phrase. Relying on a strong body 
of appellate case law, in a case consolidated from petitions filed in 
several different circuits, the National Pork Producers court 
stated that such discharges occur “when rainwater comes in 
contact with manure and flows into navigable waters.” Nat’l Pork 
Producers, 635 F.3d at 743 (citing Fishermen Against Destruction 
of Env’t, Inc. v. Closter Farms, Inc., 300 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th 
Cir. 2002); Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 121). However, rainwater 
contacting manure is not the issue in the instant case. Here, the 
farm operators sprayed the liquid fertilizer onto already-
saturated fields, causing the fertilizer to flow through the 
drainage ditch and into a river. A6. 
Second, the regulation requires that NMPs “[e]stablish 
protocols to land apply manure, litter or process wastewater in 
accordance with site specific nutrient management practices that 
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ensure appropriate agricultural utilization of the nutrients in the 
manure, litter or process wastewater.” 40 C.F.R. 
§122.42(e)(1)(viii). Moon Moo explicitly failed to implement site-
specific practices to ensure that the crops on its land were able to 
absorb and utilize the nutrients in the soil amendment. Moon 
Moo added liquid whey to its manure before applying the mixture 
to the farm’s fields, which both Dr. Mae and Dr. Green indicated 
would limit the ability of the Bermuda grass to uptake nutrients 
from the liquid fertilizer sprayed on the fields. See A6. In 
addition, the farm applied the liquid waste mixture to the land 
during a period of heavy rain. As Dr. Mae indicated, this is a very 
poor nutrient management practice. A6.11 
Even if it is true that Moon Moo’s NMP did not prevent it 
from spraying manure on its fields during a rain event, A6-7, the 
test set forward in Waterkeeper does not simply seek a 
determination of whether the CAFO adhered to its NMP. Instead, 
the rule specifies that the practices farm operators engage in 
must be site-specific and designed to ensure appropriate 
agricultural utilization of the nutrients applied to the site. 
Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d at 509. 
Updates to the CAFO regulations in light of recent cases do 
not alleviate Moon Moo’s duty to apply for a NPDES permit as a 
CAFO. In National Pork Producers, the Fifth Circuit upheld the 
“duty to apply” for a NPDES permit imposed on CAFOs that are 
discharging. 635 F.3d at 756. The updates to the regulation 
following National Pork Producers eliminated the obligation of 
CAFOs to “propose to discharge.” Compare 40 C.F.R. 122.23(d) 
(2011), with 40 C.F.R. 122.23(d) (2012). The new regulation also 
removed the option for CAFOs to become “no discharge” CAFOs 
by certifying that they will “not be in violation of the requirement 
that CAFOs that propose to discharge seek permit coverage.” 40 
C.F.R. 122.23(i) (2011) (repealed 2012); see 77 Fed. Reg. 44,497 
(Jul. 30, 2012). These adjustments challenge Moon Moo’s status 
as a “no discharge” operation, A5, but do not remove its duty to 
 
 11. Additionally, the New Union Department of Agriculture does not 
generally review NMPs. A5. However, the Second Circuit found in Waterkeeper 
that “by failing to provide for EPA review of the NMPs, the 2003 Rule violated 
the statutory commandments that the permitting agency must assure 
compliance with applicable effluent or discharge limitations.” Nat’l Pork 
Producers, 635 F.3d at 745 (summarizing Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d 486). 
25
  
2015] BEST BRIEF: USA 77 
apply for a NPDES permit in light of the evidence of discharge 
collected by James. 
B.    If Moon Moo is not a CAFO, it is Exempt from 
NPDES Permitting Because it Complied with its 
NMP and was Deemed Not to be a Point Source 
Because Moon Moo meets all the other criteria for a CAFO, 
the only way this Court could find Moon Moo is not a CAFO is if 
it finds that Moon Moo did not discharge pollutants through a 
man-made drainage ditch. As described in the previous section, 
Moon Moo Farm very easily meets most of the regulatory 
requirements for qualification as a CAFO because the cows are 
confined for many more than 45 days out of the year and the 
grass grown on Moon Moo’s property does not interfere with its 
classification as a CAFO. 40 C.F.R. §122.23(b). The only element 
of the determination of whether the Moon Moo is a CAFO that 
can be disputed is whether pollutants from the farm are 
discharged into waters of the United States through a man-made 
ditch. 40 C.F.R. §122.23(b)(6)(ii)(A). It is clear that discharge from 
the farm flows into waters of the United States. As a result, the 
dispute over whether Moon Moo Farm is a CAFO hinges on 
whether the man-made ditch on the farm’s land facilitates the 
discharge of pollutants. This exact same inquiry would need to be 
made in a determination of whether Moon Moo Farm was a point 
source outside of the CAFO context. 
This Court would only reach the conclusion that Moon Moo is 
not a CAFO if it rejected the Government’s arguments that the 
inadequacy of the Farm’s NMP precludes the permit from 
shielding the farm operators from liability for their discharges. 
This determination would very likely preclude the Court from 
finding that the farm is a point source of any kind, since a point 
source is defined by the CWA as “any discernible, confined and 
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any . . . ditch.” 
33 U.S.C. §1362(14). In the absence of confidence that the ditch 
served as a conveyance, the farm would not be considered a point 
source, and would, instead be a nonpoint source. See Or. Natural 
Desert Ass’n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 1998) (The 
CWA defines point sources and clarifies that “[o]ther pollution 
sources, such as runoff from agriculture . . . are nonpoint 
sources.”). In fact, it is likely that without a drainage ditch 
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collecting and concentrating liquid manure, and perhaps due to a 
misreading of the details of the instant case, the court would find 
that the discharge from Moon Moo constitutes agricultural runoff. 
Courts have a longstanding history of considering agricultural 
runoff nonpoint source pollution. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2001); Frank 
P. Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law §3.03 (2009) (“Nonpoint 
sources include pollution from diffuse land use activities such as 
agriculture. . .”). If Moon Moo is a nonpoint source, it is not 
subject to NPDES permitting requirements because agricultural 
runoff is not subject to NPDES permitting. 33 U.S.C. §1342(f) 
(indicating that the EPA Administrator can only promulgate 
regulations to restrict point sources). 
In sum, this Court should find that Moon Moo is a CAFO 
subject to NPDES permitting, or, alternatively, that it is not a 
CAFO and does not have an obligation to apply for a NPDES 
permit. Because there is no dispute regarding the facts necessary 
for this inquiry, summary judgment in favor of Appellants is 
appropriate. 
IV.  UNDER RCRA, MOON MOO’S ACTIVITIES 
PRESENT AN ENDANGERMENT BUT THEY DO 
NOT CONSTITUTE ILLEGAL OPEN DUMPING 
Riverwatcher makes two claims in the alternative against 
Moon Moo pursuant to the citizen suit provisions of RCRA, a 
“comprehensive environmental statute that governs the 
treatment, storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste,” 
Meghrig v. KFC W., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996).12 First, 
Riverwatcher contends that Moon Moo’s manure-spreading 
operations “present an imminent and substantial endangerment 
to health or the environment.” See 42 U.S.C. §6972(a)(1)(B). 
Second, Riverwatcher alleges that Moon Moo’s manure-spreading 
operations violate RCRA’s open dumping ban. See 42 U.S.C. 
 
 12. RCRA’s “anti-duplication” provision proscribes application of RCRA to the 
same activities and substances regulated by other environmental statutes, 
including, as is the case here, the CWA. 42 U.S.C. § 6905(a); see e.g., Coon ex rel. 
Coon v. Willet Dairy, LP, 536 F.3d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 2008) (RCRA did not apply 
to activities of a dairy farm for which it had CWA permit); Greenpeace, Inc. v. 
Waste Techs. Indus., 9 F.3d 1174, 1178 (6th Cir.1993) (dismissing endangerment 
claim against operator operating within limits of valid RCRA permit). 
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§6972(a)(1)(A) (authorizing citizen enforcement of violations of 
the open dumping ban). 
The first step in reviewing a RCRA claim is to confirm that a 
solid waste is involved. “EPA distinguishes between RCRA’s 
regulatory and remedial purposes and offers a different definition 
of solid waste depending upon the statutory context in which the 
term appears.” Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington 
Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1314 (2d Cir. 1993). Notably, “a 
different definition applies to permitting violation claims than to 
claims of ‘imminent and substantial endangerment.’” Cordiano v. 
Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 205 (2d Cir. 2009). 
The statute broadly defines solid waste as “any garbage, 
refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply 
treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other 
discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained 
gaseous material . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §6903(27) (emphasis added). 
While the statute does not define “discarded,” courts have defined 
the term according to the dictionary and common usage as “‘cast 
aside; reject; abandon; give up,’” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 
373 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 1 The New Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary 684 (4th ed.1993)), and have further 
explained that “material is not discarded until after it has served 
its intended purpose.” No Spray Coal., Inc. v. New York, 252 F.3d 
148, 150 (2d Cir. 2001). Accordingly, once a product is 
“indisputably discarded” it has become part of the waste disposal 
stream and may be regulated under RCRA. Am. Petroleum Inst. 
v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 741 (D.C. Cir.1990); see also Conn. Coastal, 
989 F.2d at 1314-15 (determining, “[w]ithout deciding how long 
materials must accumulate before they become discarded,” that 
shot and targets released into the environment, and left long 
after serving their intended purpose, had been “discarded”). For 
example, pesticides sprayed in order to reach and kill mosquitoes 
were not discarded because “material is not discarded until after 
it has served its intended purpose.” No Spray Coal., 252 F.3d at 
150.13 Additionally, “the fact that discarded materials are ‘solid 
 
 13. This doctrine is distorted by the Ninth Circuit’s pronouncement that 
materials are not discarded if “dispersal to the environment is an expected 
consequence of [their] use.” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec., 713 
F.3d 502, 515-16 (9th Cir. 2013). Without defining “expected consequences,” the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding has the potential to exclude from the definition of 
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waste’ under RCRA does not change ‘just because a reclaimer has 
purchased or finds value in the components.’” Safe Air, 373 F.3d 
at 1043 n.8 (citing United States v. ILCO, 996 F.2d 1126, 1131 
(11th Cir. 1993)). 
The regulatory definition at 40 C.F.R.§261.2 narrows the 
definition of “solid waste” by explaining that “discarded material” 
is “abandoned”, “recycled”, “inherently waste-like” or a “military 
munition” as those terms are further defined in RCRA Subtitle C, 
which governs the treatment, transportation, storage and 
disposal of regulated hazardous waste. The regulations also 
exempt a number of materials from qualification as, and 
therefore disposal requirements of, solid waste. See, e.g., 40 
C.F.R. § 257.1(c)(1) (excluding from the open dumping criteria 
“agricultural wastes, including manures and crop residues, 
returned to the soil as fertilizers or soil conditioners”). A 
regulated solid waste is always a solid waste under the statute 
but the reverse is not always true. 
The district court mistakenly applied the same statutory 
definition of “solid waste” in its rejection of both the 
endangerment and open dumping claims. Accordingly, the district 
court erred in dismissing Riverwatcher’s endangerment claim. 
However, Moon Moo has not violated the open dumping ban, 
which the district court correctly dismissed. 
A.   The District Court’s Singular Reliance on the 
Regulatory Definition of “Solid Waste” Defies 
Congressional Intent to Protect Health and the 
Environment 
RCRA’s primary and overriding objective is “to promote the 
protection of health and the environment 42 U.S.C. § 6902. To 
that end, Congress authorized both citizens and the Government 
to bring suit “against any person . . . who has contributed or who 
is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, 
treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous 
 
“discarded” any materials for which spills, leaks, and oversaturation could be 
construed as “expected consequences” of use. Such a gross expansion of the 
Second Circuit’s holding in No Spray Coal., 252 F.3d at 150, upon which the 
Ninth Circuit purports to rely, will likely encourage and indemnify use of 
countless high-risk products simply because the risks they pose may be 
expected. Surely this was not Congress’s intent. 
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waste which may present an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to health or the environment.” 42 U.S.C. 
§6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing citizen suits); id §6973. (authorizing 
such suits by the EPA Administrator). “[T]he statute itself still 
provides the relevant definition for purposes of Subtitle G, which 
authorizes the Administrator—or, indeed, ‘any person’—to bring 
suit in order to force such action as may be necessary to abate ‘an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the 
environment’ caused by solid waste.” Military Toxics Project v. 
EPA, 146 F.3d 948, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal citations 
omitted). 
1.  Congress Intended the Endangerment 
Standard to Be Broad 
To provide the most protection for public health and the 
environment, the standard for RCRA endangerment claims 
permits “any person” to bring suit against: 
any person, including the United States and any other 
governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who has contributed 
or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, 
treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous 
waste which may present an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to health or the environment. 
42 U.S.C. §6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Courts have 
interpreted this endangerment standard broadly. First, 
endangerment requires “threatened or potential harm and does 
not require proof of actual harm.” Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 
606, 610 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Price v. U.S. Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 
1019 (9th Cir. 1994). An emergency is not required. See, e.g., 
Maine People’s Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 296 
(1st Cir. 2006). Second, “imminence” “implies that there must be 
a threat which is present now, although the impact of the threat 
may not be felt until later.” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486. Third, an 
endangerment is “substantial” if there is “some reasonable cause 
for concern that someone or something may be exposed to a risk 
of harm by a release or a threatened release of a hazardous 
substance if remedial action is not taken.” Interfaith Cmty. Org. 
v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 259 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). Quantification of the 
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endangerment, such as proof that a certain number of persons 
will be exposed or that a water supply will be contaminated to a 
specific degree, is not required. Id. And, fourth, endangerment 
claims are not contingent on other violations of law. See, e.g., Cox 
v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 291-92 (5th Cir. 2001) (the 
endangerment provisions are “essentially a codification of 
common law nuisance remedies”).14 For the foregoing reasons, the 
standards for establishing endangerment are generous in order to 
most comprehensively protect human health and the 
environment. 
2.  Riverwatcher’s Endangerment Claim Was 
Improperly Dismissed 
Dismissal was improper because the district court applied 
the wrong standard and Riverwatcher has established an 
endangerment under the proper standard. As a threshold matter, 
the district court erred by using in its endangerment analysis the 
regulatory definition of “solid waste,” which applies only to the 
open dumping claim. The statutory definition includes the term 
“discarded material,” 42 U.S.C. §6903(27), but it does not contain 
the concepts “abandoned” or “disposed of” required by the 
regulatory definition, 40 C.F.R. §§261.2(a)(2), (b)(1); Conn. 
Coastal, 989 F.2d at 1316. The soil amendment is discarded 
because there is no evidence that the acid whey from Chokos 
beneficially conditions or fertilizes the soil, and the fact that 
Moon Moo has received it for free, A5, suggests that it has no 
market value and should be considered part of the waste stream. 
See Safe Food & Fertilizer v. EPA, 350 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 
2003), reh’g on other grounds, 365 F.3d 46 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(stating that RCRA’s statutory definition covers materials 
beneficially reused in another industrial process “if they can 
reasonably be considered part of the waste disposal problem”). By 
simply incorporating the regulatory analysis, the district court 
overlooked the fact that both the acid whey, which Moon Moo has 
“accepted (without paying for)” from the Chokos plant, A5, and 
 
 14. In fact, endangerment claims are often precluded by violations of law. For 
example, endangerment claims do not apply to permit violations under the 
CWA. Supra note 12. 
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the manure are discarded within the ordinary meaning required 
by the statute. 
Next, Moon Moo “is contributing to or has contributed to” the 
handling of this waste. Moon Moo has contributed to the 
endangerment by mixing acid whey and manure and spreading 
this substance on its fields. See A5. The district court improperly 
considered the fact that Moon Moo’s operation may not have been 
the “but for” cause of the elevated nitrate levels. A11. 
Endangerment claims require that a defendant “contribute to”—
not be the “but for cause” of—the endangerment. E.g., Cox, 256 
F.3d at 295 (defining “contribute to” to mean “have a part or 
share in producing an effect”). Additionally, Moon Moo is not 
absolved by the contention that “land application of whey as a soil 
conditioner was a longstanding practice . . . in New Union since 
the 1940s,” A6, because RCRA’s endangerment provisions extend 
to “any person . . . who has contributed or who is contributing to,” 
42 U.S.C. §6972(a)(1)(B), “regardless of fault or negligence,” H.R. 
Rep. No. 98-1133, at 119 (1984) (Conf. Rep.). 
Finally, Moon Moo’s spreading activities have contributed to 
the elevated nitrate levels, as illustrated by the April 2013 
advisory, and constitute an endangerment. The district court 
fundamentally misunderstood the purpose of RCRA when it ruled 
that despite health risks to children, no endangerment exists 
because “it appears that nitrates pose no health risks to adults 
and juveniles, and that households with infants administer 
bottled water to their infants, avoiding any potential health risk.” 
A11-12.15 For this proposition, the court below relies on a non-
binding lower court decision, which disregarded the 
Congressional intent of RCRA. In Davies v. Nat’l Co-op. Refinery 
Ass’n, 963 F. Supp. 990, 999 (D. Kan. 1997), the district court’s 
solution to what it conceded to be serious pollution of drinking 
water was that “the threat of exposure can always be avoided by 
evacuating property where hazardous waste is found or by taking 
other extraordinary measures.” Davies, 963 F. Supp. at 999. The 
 
 15. Government studies confirm that nitrates ingested through drinking 
water can impair oxygen delivery to tissues and result in adverse effects 
including coma and death. While infants under 3 months are at highest risk, 
ingestion of nitrates poses risks to older children and adults at higher levels. See 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Nitrates and Nitrites: TEACH Chemical Summary 1 
(2007). 
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Davies court further stated that requiring the Plaintiffs to use 
bottled rather than groundwater is “an inconvenience and an 
economic burden,” but is still appropriately settled in an action at 
law. Id. This explanation is in direct conflict with the legislative 
intent of prevention  and protection, as noted in RCRA and other 
environmental legislation. See, e.g., Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 
1092, 1098 (8th Cir. 1995) (“RCRA’s goal is to prevent the creation 
of hazardous waste sites.”) (emphasis added). 
Because Riverwatcher has established as a matter of law 
that Moon Moo’s spreading activities may present an 
endangerment to health or the environment, the Court should 
grant summary judgment in its favor. If, however, the Court 
determines that the record is inadequate to apply the fact-
sensitive endangerment standard, the Court should remand the 
endangerment claim for additional fact-finding.16 
B.   Moon Moo Farm’s Spreading Activities Do Not 
Constitute Illegal Open Dumping 
Moon Moo’s manure-spreading activities do not constitute 
open dumping under RCRA because the soil amendment is 
serving its intended purpose and therefore not “discarded” within 
the definition of RCRA and, even if it were, agricultural wastes 
returned to the soil as fertilizer or conditioner are exempt from 
the open dumping ban. RCRA specifically proscribes “open 
dumping of solid waste.” 42 U.S.C. §6945(a). To prevent over-
regulation and conserve government resources, EPA has 
delineated materials and activities that are not of regulatory 
 
 16. For cases highlighting the fact-sensitive nature of similar endangerment 
claims, see Citizens George & Margaret, LLC, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1160 (E.D. 
Wash. 2013) (dismissal of endangerment claim against dairies for alleged 
contamination of drinking water would be premature “without any argument or 
evidence as to whether the manure was put to its intended use and/or used for 
beneficial purposes by Defendants under the circumstances unique to this 
case”); Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., No. 4:01-CV-27–H(3), 
2001 WL 1715730, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2001) (“[W]hether defendants 
return animal waste to the soil for fertilization purposes or instead apply waste 
in such large quantities that its usefulness as organic fertilizer is eliminated is a 
question of fact.”). See also Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 05-CV-0329-
GKF-PJC, 2010 WL 653032 at *11-12 (N.D. Okla. Feb 17, 2010) (determining, 
after extensive inquiry into the material’s market value and a finding on the 
benefit of its soil application, that poultry litter applied to the soil did not 
constitute “solid waste”). 
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concern, and are therefore exempt from the open dumping ban. 
See 40 C.F.R. §257.1(c).  
Courts have distinguished between “recycling” and 
“discarding”: materials destined for immediate reuse as part of an 
ongoing production process are not subject to RCRA because they 
are not discarded. Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1193 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Congress clearly and unambiguously expressed 
its intent that ‘solid waste’ (and therefore EPA’s regulatory 
authority) be limited to materials that are ‘discarded’ by virtue of 
being disposed of, abandoned, or thrown away.”). 
Congress has explicitly exempted from the open dumping ban 
“agricultural wastes, including manures and crop residues, 
returned to the soil as fertilizers or soil conditioners.” 40 C.F.R. 
§257.1(c)(1); see also 40 C.F.R. § 246.101(a) (defining agricultural 
solid waste as “solid waste that is generated by the rearing of 
animals, and the producing and harvesting of crops or trees”). 
Animal waste, per se, is not automatically exempt. Rather, such 
agricultural waste, including manure, is exempt if it is “returned 
to the soil as fertilizers or soil conditioners.” Id. §257.1(c)(1) 
(emphasis added). 
The district court properly recognized that Moon Moo’s soil 
amendment is likely not a “solid waste” under the regulatory 
framework. A11. The liquid manure is in-process secondary 
material outside the reach of RCRA because it is beneficially 
reused within the yogurt production process, which includes both 
the dairy and the activities at the Chokos plant. See, e.g., Am. 
Mining Cong., 824 F.2d at 1193 (in-process secondary materials 
are not within RCRA). 
Moreover, even if the Court were to find that the soil 
amendment is properly considered “solid waste” for regulatory 
purposes, the open dumping claim necessarily fails because 
agricultural waste returned to the soil as conditioner or fertilizer 
is specifically exempt from the open dumping ban. A5; 40 C.F.R. 
§257.1(c)(1); see, e.g., Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1041 (RCRA’s solid 
waste regulations do not cover grass residue burned as soil 
amendment). Riverwatcher did not challenge the utility of 
applying manure and whey as soil conditioner. Without a factual 
dispute, this Court should assume, as the district court did, that 
the soil amendment is conditioning the soil and is therefore 
exempt from the open dumping ban. 
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The district court correctly dismissed Riverwatcher’s open 
dumping claims. A decision to the contrary would require EPA to 
overregulate substances and activities it has determined 
generally do not present a hazard to human health or the 
environment and would proscribe beneficial reuse of materials. 
To the extent that activities exempt from both permitting and the 
open dumping ban threaten human health and the environment, 
the imminent and substantial endangerment mechanism 
provides the Government and citizens alike a sufficient backstop. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Government respectfully asks 
the Court to reverse the district court’s determinations on the 
following points and instead find that: (1) Queechunk is a publicly 
navigable waterway; (2) even if it were not, evidence obtained by 
a private party (even through trespass) is admissible in a civil 
enforcement proceeding under the CWA; (3) Moon Moo is a CAFO 
whose discharge from its manure land application area subjects it 
to NPDES permitting; and (4) Moon Moo’s spreading activities 
present an imminent and substantial endangerment. The 
Government further petitions the Court to affirm the district 
court’s rulings that (1) if Moon Moo is not a CAFO, application of 
manure in compliance with an NMP exempts it from NPDES 
permitting requirements as agricultural stormwater and (2) 
Moon Moo has not violated the open dumping provisions of 
RCRA. 
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